Thread: Monte Casino Debate

Hi All,

Another disscussion point i'd like to bring up on the Italian Campaign. Would it of been feasable to of skirted round Monte Casino surrounding it and waiting for the Germans to be starved out rather than waste the lives of over 100,000 Allied servicemen? The Americans bombed the crap out of it anyway so what was the point on wasting those lives.
Personnally i think they should of bombed and moved, bombed and moved but the allied command as usual just sat round waiting for someone else to make the move. We could of had troops across the Gustuav Line and heading towards Rome before the Germans would of been able to react.
Would be great to hear some other views on this discussion.

Sniper

I've been to Monte Cassino and hiked some of the terrain. There was no need to bomb the abbey at first, according to von Senger und Etterlin. He mentions in his memoir, that the Germans were not initially in the abbey. They had tried to get some of the art and relics out of the site. An artillerie observation post was in a different structure, which looks like a tower on the hill in the foreground of Monte Cassino. After Clarke ordered the bombing of the abbey, it became prime realestate to set up defensive positions as well as a better protected artlillerie op.

Some interesting comments about Tallboy. Had the device been available it could have caused serious damage, if not directly in the form of AP, but to the morale of the Germans underneath.

The locals, when I was there, stated that the Allies continued to bomb the area after the battle had ended. Some sixty years later, there were some anti Allied feelings from the bombing, but excellent food in the local trattoria in town.

Tactically, the Allies could have cut the boot coming across from Nettuno to L'Aquila, with a second landing at Pescara or airborne landing at Tempera. The mountains are more traversable than to the south at this point. The Gustav line was also to the south and its troops would be cut off from supply. If they moved north to engage, they would lose their cover, artillerie fire support and defensive positions, as well as be subjected to more effective Allied air attack.

The Operation would need a hard charging commander such as Lucian Truscott as it would fail with someone like John Lucas. During the landing the Allies caught the Germans unprepared. Remember the story of the German offiziers coming back from Rome? It was Lucas' indecision that allowed Kesslering time for reinforcement almost leading to dislodgement.

Although not likely, there was the possibility of a Pass too far.