Quote:
Originally Posted by Kyt |
These pilots were not spineless wonders. They were "coalface" combat fighters whose Aircraft was not designed for the job at hand.
Excerpts from the inquiry:
One consequence of MacArthur's involvement in the SWPA which had direct bearing on the "mutiny", was his determination to keep the RAAF out of direct action with the Japanese, with the plum air offence roles being taken by the Americans. Looking back on the role of MacArthur in the South West Pacific, former Chief of Air Staff George Jones commented that MacArthur had "sidestepped" Australia out of the final victory over Japan, as he wanted all the glory for himself. (79) Ultimately, this secondary role in the final stages of the War with Japan, resulted in considerable discontent amongst the Australians. In his Report, Barry stated that it was apparent, that, as a consequence of this arrangement: RAAF Headquarters had no control over the operational role assigned
to First TAF and therefore cannot be held responsible for that role
or for the manner in which operational activities within the
assignment to First TAF were carried out ... Even when First TAF
came for the first time under RAAF Command, RAAF Headquarters still
had no control over, and thus no responsibility for, First TAF's
operational activities. (80)
Vindicating the stand taken by Arthur and his fellow "mutineers", Barry stated that Undoubtedly a conditioning factor of great importance in the state
of affairs that developed at First TAF ... Inevitably it produced a
feeling of being in a backwater, as it were, far removed from the
progress of the Pacific War. This feeling was not dissipated by
knowledge of the forthcoming operations against the enemy in Borneo.
I have no doubt that a considerable amount of effort was expended by
the Wings within First TAF on useless targets." (81)
He concluded that The evidence satisfies me that, upon the facts known to them, they
were reasonably entitled to conclude that the operations upon which
they were engaged were wasteful and unnecessary. I find therefore
that Group Captains Arthur and Caldwell, and Squadron Leaders
Gibbes, Waddy and Grace sincerely believed, upon the information at
their disposal, that the operations which they have described at
length in their evidence were of no real value in the prosecution of
the war. (82)