Gamble In North Africa - Mussolini's Venture - Hitler's Intervention

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GAMBLE IN NORTH AFRICA - MUSSOLINI'S VENTURE - HITLER'S INTERVENTION


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WWII* Chapter 10

On June 1940, when Mussolini at last cast his hand for war, Italy had already in North Africa some 236,000 troops, over 1,800 guns, 150 aircraft and some 340 light tanks. These were divided as the Italian 5th Army to the West of Libya, and the 10th Army to the East, the two together amounting to a total of 14 Italian divisions. Ranged against them, but not yet in action, were eight French and five British divisions, the British under the command of General Sir Archibald Wavell. Of the 100,000 British troops, only 36,000 were in Egypt and ready to fight if their positions were attacked. The remainder were to the rear.
The armistice with the French at the end of June altered the balance significantly, taking the French army out of the calculation, and, on the other side of the coin, destroying the Italian commander Marshal Balbo's hopes of taking the Tunisian port of Bizerta to simplify his line of supply. To keep the Italians at a disadvantage, the British 7th Armoured Division began to make daily armoured raids across the Libyan frontier, the success of which, although in fact due to superior British training and discipline, was interpreted by the Italian Army as being the result of the inferiority of Italian weapons.
On June 28th, when it became clear that French North Africa would remain loyal to the Vichy government of Marshal Petain, the Italian Supreme Command ordered Balbo to invade Egypt. On the same day, having not received the order, Balbo suffered a fate that justified the Germans' worst fears about their tempestuous allies - he was shot out of the air over Tobruk by his own anti-aircraft gunners and killed. This was neither the first time nor the last that the Italian forces employed the "own goal" as a technique in warfare, but it was the only occasion when they used it to dispose of their own Commander in Chief.
Balbo's command was assumed by Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, and the date for the invasion was set for July 15th, 1940. The difficulties presented by the enterprise were formidable. There was but one supply route available across the desert from the Libyan frontier to Alexandria, and that route included two British bases, Sidi Barrani and Mersa Matruh. Graziani, sensibly, decided he was not prepared to begin the advance until he had sufficient trucks and water transport to keep his forces supplied. He asked approval to defer the assault until October 1940. Mussolini, predictably, refused to countenance such a practical suggestion. Knowing that Hitler intended to invade Britain on the 15th September, he was determined that Italy should take Egypt from Britain on the same day. Throughout July and August there were fierce disputes, inflammatory telegrams and endless problems between Mussolini and the Supreme Command, and between Mussolini and Graziani.