Fairey Battle

Kyt · 03-11-2007, 04:29 PM

A very unfortunate service history but back in 1937 it was seen as a very modern aircraft.

Flight magazine article about the construction and technical details of the airaft that failed miserably during the Battle for France

Kyt · 03-11-2007, 04:31 PM

the second section of the Flight article

Kyt · 03-11-2007, 04:44 PM

The Battle of France was a desperate affair, but some actions stand out to show just how desperate it was.

On 12 May 1940, six Battles of 12 Squadron attacked the bridges over the Albert Canal, when four of the aircraft were destroyed. Two Victoria Crosses were awarded posthumously for the action - to Flying Officer Garland and navigator/bombardier Sgt. Gray of Battle P2204/K - for pressing home the attack in spite of the heavy defensive fire. The third crewmember, rear gunner Leading Aircraftman Lawrence Reynolds, did not share the award. Garland's Battle destroyed one span of the bridge, although the German army quickly erected a pontoon bridge to replace it.

The LG citation

Flying Officer Donald Edward GARLAND (40105).
563627 Sergeant Thomas GRAY

Flying Officer Garland was the pilot and Sergeant Gray the observer of the leading aircraft of a formation of five aircraft that attacked a bridge over the Albert Canal which had not been destroyed and was allowing the enemy to advance into Belgium. All the air crews of the squadron concerned volunteered for the operation and, after five crews had been selected by drawing lots, the attack was delivered at low altitude against this vital target. Orders were issued that this bridge was to be destroyed at all costs.

As had been anticipated, exceptionally intense machine gun and anti-aircraft fire was encountered, and the bridge area was heavily protected by enemy fighters. In spite of this the formation successfully delivered a dive bombing attack from the lowest practicable altitude and British fighters in the vicinity reported that the target was obscured by the bombs bursting on it and in its vicinity. Only one aircraft returned from this mission out of the five concerned. The pilot of this aircraft reports that in addition to the extremely heavy antiaircraft fire, through which our aircraft dived to attack the objective, they were also attacked by a large number of enemy fighters after they had released their bombs on the target. Much of the success of this vital operation must be attributed to the formation leader; Flying Officer Garland, and to the coolness and resource of Sergeant Gray, who navigated Flying Officer Garland's! aircraft under most difficult onditions in such a manner that the whole formation was able successfully to attack the target in spite of subsequent heavy losses'. Flying Officer Garland and Sergeant Gray unfortunately failed to return from the mission.

Kyt · 03-11-2007, 04:54 PM

This shows how badly the Battle was mauled during the few weeks of the campaign:

Quote:

The German offensive finally began at dawn on the 10th May 1940, and by midday the RAF C-in-C, British Air Forces in France, ordered the first wave of Battles into action against German troop movements in Luxembourg. As it was impossible to provide fighter escort the bombers were briefed to make a very low approach to target and attack from as little as 250' using bombs with a delayed fuse. Intense small arms fire was encountered and three Battles of the first wave were shot down. A similar fate befell the second wave during the afternoon. Of the 32 Battles that took part that day, 13 were lost and all the rest damaged. On the following day eight Battles were despatched by Nos. 88 and 218 Squadrons only one returned. On the 12th an attempt was made to stop the German the advance towards Brussels by bombing two road bridges over the Albert Canal. No.12 Squadron sent six aircraft to carry out this task, non of which returned (this action is described in the VC section below).

On the 14th of May ten Battles from Nos. 103 and 150 Squadron attacked German pontoon bridges in the Sedan area. By employing a high level approach and by not encountering any enemy aircraft they suffered no losses. But in the afternoon of the same day all available Battles were despatched to the same target. This time BF109's were present and the losses were:
No.12 Squadron - lost four out of five
No.88 Squadron - lost one out of ten
No.103 Squadron - lost three out of eight
No.105 Squadron - lost six out of eleven
No.142 Squadron - lost four out of eight
No.150 Squadron - lost four out of four
No.218 Squadron - lost ten out of eleven
No.226 Squadron - lost three out of six
In all from the 63 Battles that took off only 28 made it back.

http://www.pavaservices.com/cfs/Battle.htm

Adrian Roberts · 04-11-2007, 01:13 AM

Thanks, Kiran, for this. Several interesting points for discussion:

1] To what extent was the Battle's losses the fault of the aircraft, rather than the tasks it was expected to do? Was there any day bomber of the early part of WW2 which did not suffer horrendous losses when attacked by enemy fighters, or to AA when attacking targets at low level? The Blenheim, the Skua, the TBD Devastator, the Lockheed Ventura, the Ju87 Stuka, the Potez 63, the Tupolev SB2, all suffered high casualty rates where operated in areas where they did not have air superiority. Later in the war, the Mosquito got away with it because it was genuinely faster than the opposition, and the US day bombers such as the B25 succeeded by partly having a heavy defensive armament but more importantly by having a strong fighter escorts.

2] The VC awards to Garland and Gray: this is the only time that a pilot and navigator (Observer, to be precise) of one aircraft were both awarded VCs, The controversy here is not so much that the observer was awarded the VC but that the air gunner was not. But the assumption was that Gray must have navigated under extreme pressure, but Reynolds was not in a position to make any contribution to the actual bombing attack or to be part of the decision process. It could be described as quite progressive thinking to acknowledge that an aircraft had more than just a pilot on board to exercise courage, but I imagine that in later instances it was felt that the award would be cheapened by being approved for more than one of the crew, and when the pilot was awarded a VC it was as a representative of his crew, in same way as a ship's captain was. The pilot, or Captain, makes the decision to attack. But the first account I ever read of this action was in John Frayn Turner's book "VCs of the Air", which I read when I was about twelve: this book doesn't even mention Reynold's presence; it was only much later that I realised the aircraft even had an A/G.

3] Note that the 1937 Flight article seems to assume a two-man crew, with the observer acting as gunner as well as navigating, bomb-aiming and operating the wireless. Presumably these roles were separated out later.

4] The prone bomb-aimer's position must have been very cramped given that the centre-section spar must have carried through in this area. Pity they don't show just how he fitted in. The diagram in pdf 7 gives some clue, but I would have liked more on this. Sadly there are no complete Battles in existence to examine.

5] re.: the article on pdf 8 on the Zurich Air Race. Note that the Me 109, as flown by a certain Colonel Udet, is not refered to as a Messerschmidt, but as a BFW, which presumably stands for Bayerisch Flugzeug-Werke [Bavarian Aircraft Factory]. Was this in fact always the correct designation?

Kyt · 04-11-2007, 11:33 AM

Strewth Adrian, you don't ask simple questions, do you?

I have to think about a couple but I can answer your last one now. As you state BF is the Bayerische Flugzeugwerke (Bavarian Aircraft Works), which Willy Messerschmitt joined in the 1920s. In the late 1930s, the company was changed to Messerschmitt AG, with Willy becoming Director. Those aircraft that had been designed before this retained the Bf (108, 109, 110 - can't remember any others) on official documents, and the ones after became Me. However, the two became pretty much interchangeable.

Kyt · 04-11-2007, 12:33 PM

Quote:

3] Note that the 1937 Flight article seems to assume a two-man crew, with the observer acting as gunner as well as navigating, bomb-aiming and operating the wireless. Presumably these roles were separated out later.

4] The prone bomb-aimer's position must have been very cramped given that the centre-section spar must have carried through in this area. Pity they don't show just how he fitted in. The diagram in pdf 7 gives some clue, but I would have liked more on this. Sadly there are no complete Battles in existence to examine.

Have just been reading the entry for the Battle in Fairey Aircraft since 1915 by Taylor and it confirms what I thought - namely that the aircraft always had a 3-man crew. However, the Flight article seems to be an composite of their own research and details gleened from the original Air Ministry specifications. The AM specs originally intended it to be a 2-man crew, which assumed that the task of navigation and radio-operation wasn't that difficult. It certainly highlights how far behind the thinking was about the nature of future war, and also the skills of the navigator.

But to be fair, it was only when the war actually started, and was well into its second year, that Bomber Command finally accepted that navigation skills were wanting, especially when entire cities couldn't be found with the equipment and training then available.

Unfortunately, I can't seem to attach the relevant section on the Battle as a pdf but if you are interested I'll email it to you.

Kyt · 04-11-2007, 12:55 PM

Quote:

1] To what extent was the Battle's losses the fault of the aircraft, rather than the tasks it was expected to do? Was there any day bomber of the early part of WW2 which did not suffer horrendous losses when attacked by enemy fighters, or to AA when attacking targets at low level? The Blenheim, the Skua, the TBD Devastator, the Lockheed Ventura, the Ju87 Stuka, the Potez 63, the Tupolev SB2, all suffered high casualty rates where operated in areas where they did not have air superiority. Later in the war, the Mosquito got away with it because it was genuinely faster than the opposition, and the US day bombers such as the B25 succeeded by partly having a heavy defensive armament but more importantly by having a strong fighter escorts.

2] The VC awards to Garland and Gray: this is the only time that a pilot and navigator (Observer, to be precise) of one aircraft were both awarded VCs, The controversy here is not so much that the observer was awarded the VC but that the air gunner was not. But the assumption was that Gray must have navigated under extreme pressure, but Reynolds was not in a position to make any contribution to the actual bombing attack or to be part of the decision process. It could be described as quite progressive thinking to acknowledge that an aircraft had more than just a pilot on board to exercise courage, but I imagine that in later instances it was felt that the award would be cheapened by being approved for more than one of the crew, and when the pilot was awarded a VC it was as a representative of his crew, in same way as a ship's captain was. The pilot, or Captain, makes the decision to attack. But the first account I ever read of this action was in John Frayn Turner's book "VCs of the Air", which I read when I was about twelve: this book doesn't even mention Reynold's presence; it was only much later that I realised the aircraft even had an A/G.

These are much grittier questions, Adrian.

It is true that most aircraft suffered, not just because of their performance. The Germans learnt in the BoB what the RAF learnt initially in France - the use of light, slow dive-bombers on their own was asking for trouble. What I find interesting is that both the British and Germans spent so much time working out their anti-aircraft doctrines but then didn't tabulating them for affects on their own attacking aircraft.

However, as Taylor states in the Fairey book, the Battle was seen by everyone as obsolete even whilst the first few aircraft were being rolled out. That's a couple of years before the war started! However, the RAF just didn't have any other alternative at that time as a replacement. As with the Defient, it was partly out dated doctrinal thinking, and partly to get as many aircraft on to the front-lines as possible as an attempt at scaring the Germans into not starting a war. Unfortunately, both the doctrine and the deterent failed, and the people who really suffered were the crews who had to fly these suicide missions.

I have always thought Reynolds' ommission as a gross injustice. As you state, more often than not, he is left out altogether. But the fact that he couldn't even be awarded another award is so sad. But one has to wonder (without taking away the bravery of the other two) whether they would have got the VC if other awards were available posthomously. Just one of those "what ifs" linked to many occassions where the VC has or hasn't been awarded.

Kyt · 04-11-2007, 10:45 PM

http://www.ipmsstockholm.org/magazin...ail_battle.htm
http://ipmsstockholm.org/magazine/19...leaddendum.htm

Adrian Roberts · 04-11-2007, 11:44 PM

Kyt
Thanks for these replies - I will reply properly tomorrow; my Broadband link has been off-line since about 9 pm until just now; this often happens on Sunday evenings; it seems to be Virginmedia's time to take down the system to maintain it. I promised myself a relatively early night tonight!
The article you mention would be particularly interesting if it has any interior diagrams in it.

Adrian