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Originally Posted by Adrian Roberts  This leads to the question of whether the Germans could have invaded Britain at all, if the RAF was neutralised. Look at the size and technology of the force the Allies had on D-Day, and the amount of planning that went into it, and compare that with the barges and hitherto untried gliders that the Germans were going to use. They couldn't have landed tanks without capturing a large port first. Not only did we have no aerial opposition on D-day, there was virtually no naval oppostion either apart from a few E-boat attacks. Most casualties to our shipping came from shore batteries. Our air superiority didn't stop one machine-gunner killing 2000 US troops on Omaha. If, in 1940, the Germans did beat the RAF, it would have taken a very long time to whittle down the RN as well.
So, thinking aloud here, I'm almost bringing myself round to thinking Anthony Cumming's way. But we wouldn't have been able to take the battle to Germany from 1941 onwards without the RAF. And Goulter quotes the German High Command (Jodl in particular) as believing that destruction of the RAF was essential, though this applied to the whole of the RAF not just Fighter Command. And in the end, it would have boiled down to our will to fight: if we had failed to retrieve the BEF at Dunkirk, and then lost Fghter Command, I wonder if our morale would have collapsed and let to a Vichy-style arrangement. |
IMO, I feel the Germans were arrogant enough to think that they could win with one of the two services contained. They could not contain/defeat the RAF and simply were not stupid enough to try and test both. Dover was set for total destruction so their port access would have been nil.
Add this to the unknowns that they knew Britain would have had waiting for them, the invasion became a very risky proposition.