IV. The Japanese Search for Soviet Mediation http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/29.pdf Quote:
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This summary includes a report on a cable from Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow concerning the emperor's decision to seek Soviet help in ending the war. Not knowing that the Soviets had already made a commitment to its Allies to declare war on Japan, Tokyo fruitlessly pursued this option for several weeks. The "Magic" intercepts from mid-July have figured in Gar Alperovitz's argument that Truman and his advisers recognized that the emperor was ready to capitulate if the Allies showed more flexibility on the demand for unconditional surrender. This point is central to Alperovitz's thesis that top U.S. officials recognized a "two-step logic" that moderating unconditional surrender and a Soviet declaration of war would have been enough to induce Japan's surrender without the use of the bomb
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http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/30.pdf Quote:
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The day after the Togo message was reported, Army intelligence chief Weckerling (Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2) proposed several possible explanations of the Japanese diplomatic initiative
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And there are other documents with commentaries on the aforementioned site.