Quote:
Originally Posted by Blackwatch  The summary conclusions of the 1945 Intelligence Report on the proposed invasion of Japan (Operation Downfall) was as follows:
1. Japan would not surrender unconditionally without a demonstration of total destruction.
2. In an invasion of the Japanese home islands, the people would fight to the death to protect their nation.
3. An invasion of the Japanese home islands would cost approximately 1 million American casualties and perhaps 10 million Japanese. (many historians and Intel Analysts think and suggest THE ENTIRE Japanese culture would die because Hirohito at first would NEVER surrender and the invasions would still be necessary despite the 2 Atomic detonations!!!) |
Actually that was just one of the alternatives considered. There were numerous options for the final defeat of Japan, with the various theatre and branch commanders each pushing for their own preferred method.
Initially, three options that were considered:
- The encirclement of the Japanese Home Islands (including lodgements on the Asian mainland), which would be followed by an invasion, as suggested by the Navy.
- The encirclement of the Japanese Home Islands (including lodgements on the Asian mainland), followed by bombardment and blockade without an invasion.
- A direct assault on Kyushu that would provide additional air and naval bases for the strike on Honshu
MacArthur was all for the final option.
Apart from the attempts of some parties within the Japanese government to seek surrender terms, which are well documented, the very issue of possible US casualties, and how they effected the final decision to drop the bombs, is still being debated:
http://home.kc.rr.com/casualties/ http://www.historyofwar.org/articles...downfall3.html http://www.milnet.com/cia/japan-end/csi9810001.html
The original documents under debate:
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...sion/final.pdf
The stated 1 million casualties was accepted, even back then, as way over-estimated figure, and the likeliest highest figure was a possible 250, 000 killed and injured US personnel.
However, the biggest concerns for Trumen were not the casualties but (a) the length of the campaign, (b) the political effect of attempting any possible negotiated peace with Japan, in the eyes of the US public, especially as this had not been allowed to happen for germany and for the US public the Japanese had always been the greater enemy, and (c) the effect of the Soviet entry into the war and how much territory they will have occupied during the period of the mainland campaign.
Considering the effects of the firebombings of the Japanese cities before the A-bombs, there was never any ethical concerns about the mass deaths of the Japanese people or considerations of the destruction of the Japanese culture.
As the post-war Occupation shows, the considerations about the Japanese culture wasn't a high priority anyway. The political and social restructuring that occurred during that post-war period was sociologically huge anyway.