On February 4 Tanahashi struck. Reports came in that during the night an enemy force of unknown strength had slipped through Messervy's positions east of the Kalapanzin. The Japanese, moving in a compact body, passed across the rice fields in the area held by our 114. Brigade. They were not spotted in the dark, even though some of our men did run into a mule. The noise of the column was thought to be our own transport.
Early on the morning of the 5th Taung Bazaar fell into enemy hands. Crowther's 89 Brigade was sent to intercept Tanahashi's force, and was engaged in fierce fighting all through that day. The Japanese had now turned south-west to threaten from the rear Messervy's main positions, and our efforts to halt their advance were not successful. That same day enemy artillery was unusually active along the whole divisional front, and Japanese aircraft made frequent sweeps over the area, paying particular attention to the eastern end of the Ngakyedauk Pass.
General Messervy wondered to himself: Should his headquarters move or stay put? As he had been preaching the doctrine of no withdrawals by anyone when the Jap came round the flank---this was a new policy from the earlier campaigns---he decided to keep his headquarters at Launggyaung, two miles north-east of the administration area in Sinzweya. He knew that to stay was a risk, but a good example would be set. Moreover, to move his headquarters at such a critical moment might mean the disruption of communications just when they were most needed.
But it was upon this very headquarters, unprotected as it was by infantry, that the assault fell. The only troops defending Launggyaung were Lieutenant-Colonel P. M. P. Hobson's Divisional Signals, and part of an Engineer Battalion. At six o'clock the air was rent by wild shouts from the Japanese. A few shots were almost smothered by a roar as of some vast football crowd, intermingled with catcalls and yells. All was uncertain in the half-light and morning mist. The members of headquarters took up their prearranged battle stations.
The Signal Office was attacked. Parties of the enemy infiltrated into the Signals area, and towards Messervy's headquarters. Machine-guns and mortars began firing into our positions from short range. Several attacks were beaten back, but all telephone lines were cut. Communication between the different parts of the headquarters was broken. Messervy with part of his staff was isolated on a steep hillock and pinned to the ground by fire. He decided that the place must be abandoned, but could get no message to this effect through to the rest of the staff and to Signals. Eventually he and a few companions managed to slip away, waded down a stream, made their way through the jungle and reached the administration area at Sinzweya.
Meanwhile Colonel Hobson, finding his men hard pressed, his casualties mounting, his wireless sets being overrun and destroyed, consulted Brigadier Hely, the C.R.A. It was decided to fight on, but soon the Japanese had established machine-gun posts along a ridge that overlooked our strong-points. Some tanks of the 25th Dragoons, which had just arrived here, were firing at these machine guns, but groups of our men found themselves caught between the two lines of fire.
The position was perilous. Resistance could not long be maintained. Hely gave the order to evacuate Launggyaung. A rendezvous was made: the eastern end of the Ngakyedauk Pass. But many new casualties were suffered in this withdrawal, and some confusion, for Japanese mortar fire broke up our parties and the main line of retreat was covered by the enemy.
In all, Hobson's Signals had seven officers, eight British and ninety Indian ranks killed or missing from that morning's fighting. 
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