BBC History debate - BofB

**Adrian Roberts** · 11-16-2007, 08:51 PM

Unusually, I picked up a copy of BBC History magazine this month, as it includes some debates about the Battle of Britain.

Leo McKinstry points out how the Spitfire was barely ready for the Battle; Anthony Cumming reiterates his argument that Fighter Command was ineffectual and only a part of the reason that the Germans called off the Invasion; Christina Goulter refutes this and claims that Fighter Command was indeed crucial.

McKinstry's article is probably the least contentious of the three. I don't think there is much doubt that the Supermarine company were inefficient and out of their depth, and the Castle Bromwich factory was built to take over production. Even this was a disaster until Beaverbrook took over - what is it with the British and management? I remember reading elsewhere that little account of ease of production was built into the Spitfire's design; it took five times as many manhours to build as an ME109.

This article points out that in 1938 many of the RAF hierarchy saw the Spitfire as a stop-gap; the fighters they were really waiting for were the Whirlwind and the Beaufighter. The thinking was that the Second Great War would be a re-run of the first; France would not be overrun, and the only enemy aircraft over Britain would be bombers, as the ME109 would have to operate from bases in Germany.

He ends up by quoting Hugh Dowding: "the main trouble was that we had such a tiny output of fighters". Goulter, however, states that the lack of aircrew was the main constraint on operations in 1940.

Cumming is on fairly safe ground to say that the pilot training scheme was inefficient, and that too many pilots arrived at their squadrons with no combat training at all. There was an article in Aeroplane recently by BofB pilot W/C Hugh Neill that put the same argument. Cumming also hightlights the problem of poorly-trained radar operators. But he then talks of the fact that the RAF obtained a kill/loss ratio of barely two to one, and that many pilots were poor shots. Maybe so, but all this is to support his thesis that "a powerful Royal Navy was a the key factor in Hitler's decision postpone Operation Sealion". But a two-one ratio is surely not bad when up against the only other (in summer '40) powerful modern air-arm in the world. And if Sealion was postponed after 15th September, what had changed Navally in that time (since that fall of France)? But the air situation had certainly changed.

Goulter accepts that a holistice view of Britain's defences needs to be taken, that the RN and Coastal and Bomber commands made a huge contribtions. But she is far less inclined to play down Fighter Commands role: "There is a clear causal connection between the Lufwaffe's failure to gain air superiority and Hitler's decision to postpone ....Sealion".

Perhaps a balanced view is that the Royal Navy was the major barrier to the Germans, but that it could not be dealt until fighter command was eliminated. What do you think?

There was another article on the Stuka: I'll post that under War in the Air tomorrow.

**Kyt** · 11-17-2007, 04:27 AM

Thanks for that Adrian. I too read the articles, and meant to go back to them for a proper read before posting.

The article on the Spitfire production was indeed interesting. Complexity of production seems to have been a feature of many early aircraft but I'm not surprised. The Air Ministry was very dependent upon small independent engineering firms putting forward designs from the vague specifications put to them, in the 1930s. One would expect these firms to want to produce the best aircraft, not the easiest to build.

I also don't think that either the AM or the designers factored in the atrition rate, nor, as you state, the sheer isolation of Britain against the enemy.

It is often stated that Britain was a manufacturing nation but that's not strictly true. The nation was industrial in raw material production, and small specialist production, but not mass production like the US.

But maybe that was one of it's saviours during the Blitz? The fact that production could be dispursed around the country to small ptr-war workshops meant that there were a lot more targets for the Germans to hit. Bombers returning to their bases reporting that they had destroyed Supermarine, for example, was seen as by their high command as a signal that the RAF would not get replacements. This obviously wasn't the case.

Originally Posted by Adrian Roberts

Perhaps a balanced view is that the Royal Navy was the major barrier to the Germans, but that it could not be dealt until fighter command was eliminated. What do you think?

It is indeed complicated. Part of this is in fact because the Sealion plans, their rationale, and Hitler's thinking, are also so vague. They too cannot be taken out of the equation. Whilst the BoB was going on, they were still arguing about how the actual invasion should take place.

I do think the RN was a major consideration for the Germans. Unlike the Allied assaults later in the war, the Germans didnot have specialised invasion equipment, boats or even the logistical know how. Even a small RN force would have caused a major disruption, especially to the river barges that were to be used.

The one way that the Germans could have tried to protect themselves was with a massive aerial screen to be used against any approaching RN units. However, this would have been of limited use if they still had to contend with RAF fighters and bombers over the invasion fleet.

So, in the actual BoB, Fighter Command did the fighting and won. But looking from the German point of view, the RN was enough of a threat to have played a significant part. And don't forget that Bomber Command was still pretty effective against the invasion barges in the French ports

morse1001 · 11-17-2007, 04:42 AM

Damn and Blast the pair of youse! I will now have to go out and buy the magazine!

**Kyt** · 11-17-2007, 04:45 AM

Worth it Morse. Don't usually buy it myself either.

**Adrian Roberts** · 11-17-2007, 08:54 PM

I do think the RN was a major consideration for the Germans. Unlike the Allied assaults later in the war, the Germans didnot have specialised invasion equipment, boats or even the logistical know how. Even a small RN force would have caused a major disruption, especially to the river barges that were to be used.

The one way that the Germans could have tried to protect themselves was with a massive aerial screen to be used against any approaching RN units. However, this would have been of limited use if they still had to contend with RAF fighters and bombers over the invasion fleet.

This leads to the question of whether the Germans could have invaded Britain at all, if the RAF was neutralised. Look at the size and technology of the force the Allies had on D-Day, and the amount of planning that went into it, and compare that with the barges and hitherto untried gliders that the Germans were going to use. They couldn't have landed tanks without capturing a large port first. Not only did we have no aerial opposition on D-day, there was virtually no naval oppostion either apart from a few E-boat attacks. Most casualties to our shipping came from shore batteries. Our air superiority didn't stop one machine-gunner killing 2000 US troops on Omaha. If, in 1940, the Germans did beat the RAF, it would have taken a very long time to whittle down the RN as well.

So, thinking aloud here, I'm almost bringing myself round to thinking Anthony Cumming's way. But we wouldn't have been able to take the battle to Germany from 1941 onwards without the RAF. And Goulter quotes the German High Command (Jodl in particular) as believing that destruction of the RAF was essential, though this applied to the whole of the RAF not just Fighter Command. And in the end, it would have boiled down to our will to fight: if we had failed to retrieve the BEF at Dunkirk, and then lost Fghter Command, I wonder if our morale would have collapsed and let to a Vichy-style arrangement.

**spidge** · 11-17-2007, 10:45 PM

Originally Posted by Adrian Roberts

This leads to the question of whether the Germans could have invaded Britain at all, if the RAF was neutralised. Look at the size and technology of the force the Allies had on D-Day, and the amount of planning that went into it, and compare that with the barges and hitherto untried gliders that the Germans were going to use. They couldn't have landed tanks without capturing a large port first. Not only did we have no aerial opposition on D-day, there was virtually no naval oppostion either apart from a few E-boat attacks. Most casualties to our shipping came from shore batteries. Our air superiority didn't stop one machine-gunner killing 2000 US troops on Omaha. If, in 1940, the Germans did beat the RAF, it would have taken a very long time to whittle down the RN as well.

So, thinking aloud here, I'm almost bringing myself round to thinking Anthony Cumming's way. But we wouldn't have been able to take the battle to Germany from 1941 onwards without the RAF. And Goulter quotes the German High Command (Jodl in particular) as believing that destruction of the RAF was essential, though this applied to the whole of the RAF not just Fighter Command. And in the end, it would have boiled down to our will to fight: if we had failed to retrieve the BEF at Dunkirk, and then lost Fghter Command, I wonder if our morale would have collapsed and let to a Vichy-style arrangement.

IMO, I feel the Germans were arrogant enough to think that they could win with one of the two services contained. They could not contain/defeat the RAF and simply were not stupid enough to try and test both. Dover was set for total destruction so their port access would have been nil.

Add this to the unknowns that they knew Britain would have had waiting for them, the invasion became a very risky proposition.

morse1001 · 11-18-2007, 02:25 AM

Originally Posted by Adrian Roberts

This leads to the question of whether the Germans could have invaded Britain at all, if the RAF was neutralised. Look at the size and technology of the force the Allies had on D-Day, and the amount of planning that went into it, and compare that with the barges and hitherto untried gliders that the Germans were going to use. They couldn't have landed tanks without capturing a large port first. Not only did we have no aerial opposition on D-day, there was virtually no naval oppostion either apart from a few E-boat attacks. Most casualties to our shipping came from shore batteries. Our air superiority didn't stop one machine-gunner killing 2000 US troops on Omaha. If, in 1940, the Germans did beat the RAF, it would have taken a very long time to whittle down the RN as well.

So, thinking aloud here, I'm almost bringing myself round to thinking Anthony Cumming's way. But we wouldn't have been able to take the battle to Germany from 1941 onwards without the RAF. And Goulter quotes the German High Command (Jodl in particular) as believing that destruction of the RAF was essential, though this applied to the whole of the RAF not just Fighter Command. And in the end, it would have boiled down to our will to fight: if we had failed to retrieve the BEF at Dunkirk, and then lost Fghter Command, I wonder if our morale would have collapsed and let to a Vichy-style arrangement.

At the end of the war, at the time of the various post mortems, they war gamed an invasion of Britian and the Germans lost, because they could not provide aerial cover for the invasion fleet.

**Kyt** · 11-25-2007, 08:58 PM

Originally Posted by Adrian Roberts

This leads to the question of whether the Germans could have invaded Britain at all, if the RAF was neutralised. Look at the size and technology of the force the Allies had on D-Day, and the amount of planning that went into it, and compare that with the barges and hitherto untried gliders that the Germans were going to use. They couldn't have landed tanks without capturing a large port first. Not only did we have no aerial opposition on D-day, there was virtually no naval oppostion either apart from a few E-boat attacks. Most casualties to our shipping came from shore batteries. Our air superiority didn't stop one machine-gunner killing 2000 US troops on Omaha. If, in 1940, the Germans did beat the RAF, it would have taken a very long time to whittle down the RN as well.

So, thinking aloud here, I'm almost bringing myself round to thinking Anthony Cumming's way. But we wouldn't have been able to take the battle to Germany from 1941 onwards without the RAF. And Goulter quotes the German High Command (Jodl in particular) as believing that destruction of the RAF was essential, though this applied to the whole of the RAF not just Fighter Command. And in the end, it would have boiled down to our will to fight: if we had failed to retrieve the BEF at Dunkirk, and then lost Fghter Command, I wonder if our morale would have collapsed and let to a Vichy-style arrangement.

I've been thinking about this for a few days and was starting to consider the differences between Sealion and Overlord. And then I find that someone else has done the work already!

Military History Online

and this site summarises the problems that a possible invasion would have encountered:

Problems with German Plans for Operation Sealion

morse1001 · 11-25-2007, 11:51 PM

Originally Posted by Kyt

I've been thinking about this for a few days and was starting to consider the differences between Sealion and Overlord. And then I find that someone else has done the work already!

Military History Online

and this site summarises the problems that a possible invasion would have encountered:

Problems with German Plans for Operation Sealion

I think the major differerance was the fact the Overlord was planned over a number of years and therefore they had time to build the equipment that they needed and Sealion which was produced in a few short months and they had to adapt existing unsuitable equipment for the invasion.

But, lets not forget, an important point was Hitler's determination to carryout the plan in the first place. Both Gehlen and Rudel both had their doubts about Hitler wanting it done and suggested that it was a stretegic deception to cover for the build up on the eastern front